Storytime: A bit of Pax Orionis

——————

Excerpt from “My Time On Fire” by Barry Wygant (weapons control officer, U.S.S. Thunderchild). Published by Radiant Fireball Press, New Houston, Texas, April 2002.

Chapter Three: Cuba

A lot of people disagree, but I’m pretty sure that the Orion program probably would have either faded away or taken much longer to come about had it not been for the Cuban War. Sure, it was a disaster for everyone involved, and for millions of people who shouldn’t have been involved, but that war gave America the solar system. Had it not been for the Orion program that rose from the ashes of Cuba, God only knows how we would have fared in the War of ’84. So a bit of history of that war is in order. Sure, it’s all pretty well known… but hey, it’s my book, I’ll tell it like I want.

World War II gave the world the atom bomb, and ended up being the first atomic war. OK, yeah, it was a one sided atomic war, but if the Japanese didn’t want to get into a nuclear shooting match they probably shouldn’t have attacked Pearl Harbor. ‘Nuff said.

The Korean War that followed was a hellish period, but somewhat surprisingly it never turned nuclear. Many in the US wanted to use atomic weaponry to blunt North Korean advances, or even take out military targets in China, but cooler heads prevailed. The Korean War ground to a halt, but the geopolitical competition between the United States and the Soviet Union did not. In the years after the Korean War, the USSR made many efforts to extend its reach and power across the globe. One of its most stunning achievements was the Cuban Communist rebellion led by Fidel Castro that overthrew the pro-western government in 1959. This event, more than the Communist blockade of Berlin, the Korean War or the Hungarian Revolution, led directly to the world we have today, for both good and ill.

The Communist takeover of Cuba in 1959 threw the United States government into something of a panic. Here was Communism on our very doorstep. The most deadly threat the US had ever faced was just ninety miles away, occupying an island that Americans had previously associated with vacations and parties and generally getting tore up. The US was caught flat-footed.

The US finally did something about it in April of 1961 with the Bay of Pigs invasion. It was a clusterfuck; a complete failure brought on by President Kennedy’s less than complete commitment to the cause. The failure of the US to provide adequate air support to what was an inadequate naval invasion made failure inevitable… and was seen by Khrushchev as an important sign of weakness.

At the time, it was clear to Soviet leadership that, despite their public boasts, their nuclear missile capabilities lagged well behind those of the United States. Soviet ICBMs at the time were woefully few and inaccurate; it is estimated that the Soviets had less than two dozen R-7 Semyorka missiles capable of striking US targets from within the USSR. On the other hand, the Soviets were doing reasonably well in the field of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. But MRBMs and IRBMs could not strike continental US targets from Soviet territory. So a base closer to the US was what the Commies needed.

The Communist Cuban dictatorship provided the opportunity that Khrushchev sought. By positioning Soviet missiles in Cuba, much of the US would be under direct nuclear threat. It seems that Khruschchev’s goal was not to rain nuclear warheads onto the US, but to use the threat those weapons posed in order to extort concessions from the weak-willed Kennedy. Specifically… the Cuban missiles would be a bargaining chip to drive the western powers out of West Berlin, and turn the entire city over to Soviet control. Castro was eager to obtain Soviet nuclear weapons, as those would, he hoped, protect him from another American invasion attempt. So in the summer of 1962, Soviet personnel began arriving in Cuba to set up missile bases.

The effort did not go un-noticed by the US, though it could not initially confirm just what was going on with any certainty. By August, U-2 spyplane overflights of Cuba showed clear signs of the construction of SA-2 “Guideline” surface-to-air missile sites. The CIA assumed that the SAM sites were to defend forthcoming surface-to-surface missile sites from American air attack. However, even though human intelligence reports from the ground indicated that large missiles – which could only be offensive weapons – were being trucked around at night, no U-2 overflights occurred from early September to October 14th. But once the U-2 overflights continued, the evidence of ballistic missiles piled up. An R-12 MRBM missile site was spotted at San Cristobel on the 14th; President Kennedy was briefed on the 15th.

A number of options were presented to the President, everything from “do nothing” to “invade now.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff were all in favor of a sudden massive attack and invasion to not only take out the missiles but to take out the Castro regime as well and replace the Communists with someone who would be friendlier to the West. I guess the thinking was that a nuclear battle with then Soviets was inevitable, and that at right that moment the US had an advantage… but if the Russkies could set up shop in Cuba and continue to build nuclear arms and delivery systems, the math would only get worse for the US. So… better sooner rather than later, it seems.

Kennedy did not want an invasion of Cuba; not only would it be a massive mess, but it would also open the door to a Soviet invasion of West Berlin in response. He wanted a political solution.

A few days later, more U-2 photos were brought in showing that four missile sites were operational. It was now clear that something must be done. The decision Kennedy made was to enforce a blockade of Cuba to keep further Soviet nuclear forces from arriving – not just missiles, but jet fighters and bombers, brought in via cargo ship. A blockade was a legally iffy proposition, and it could not be done secretly. On October 22nd, Kennedy went on TV to address the nation on the subject. Thus began what was briefly referred to in the press as “the missile crisis.”
Within a few days, the United States Navy was intercepting ships headed to Cuba. Some were allowed to pass, as they seemed to be carrying no weapons; others held back. On the 25th 14 Soviet ships turned back rather than face the blockade.

Negotiations, threats and bluster followed over the next few days. Khrushchev suggested that the US remove its Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey; in exchange the USSR would remove its missiles from Cuba. Castro wanted no part of that; instead he sent a message to Khruschchev calling for a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States.

On the morning of October 27, 1962, a U-2F piloted by USAF Major Rudolph Anderson was shot down over Cuba by a Soviet SA-2 Guideline SAM. This made a bad situation immediately worse. At the same time a group of eleven US Navy destroyers, led by the Essex-class aircraft carrier USS Randolph (CVS-15), were pursuing a suspected Soviet submarine northeast of Cuba. Another Soviet submarine was being stalked by the aircraft and ships of the combined USS Enterprise (CVN-65) and USS Independence (CV-62) battle groups south of Cuba.

The crew of the Fletcher-class destroyer USS Beale (DD-471), part of the USS Randolph battle group, dropped a handful of practice depth charges – with an explosive power approximating that of a hand grenade – in order to rattle the Soviet subs crew and force them to the surface.  These devices were small and incapable of doing any real damage to a Soviet submarine due to the limited explosive potential and the unlikelihood of actually striking a submarine. They were simple, and were simply tossed over the side by the crew. And it turns out these small devices were the trigger that set off the war. But it wasn’t until recently that this explanation has come to light.

In the mid 90’s, military archeologists wearing those lead-lined spacesuits dug through the ruins of the buried Kremlin archives. Records were found that explained just what the hell happened beneath the waves that day. The Soviet Foxtrot-class submarine B-59 was on its own; it had been out of contact with Moscow for several days and the crew were completely in the dark as to the current situation. War could very easily have broken out in the time they’d been out of communications. The air in the sub was going bad, the temperature was steadily rising and the noise was deafening. A debate raged among the senior officers as to how to respond… their orders allowed them to use torpedoes – specifically a nuclear torpedo – if the sub was damaged in an American attack. So long as the depth charges missed damaging the submarine, however, flotilla commander Vasili Arkhipov voted against use of the nuclear torpedo.

And then… one of the depth charges, through sheer happenstance, apparently detonated nearly on top of the hull. Damage to the submarine was minimal, but the sound of the explosion created a panic among the already rattled crew. Remember, they’d been under barrage for quite a while already, and were hard pressed to determine just what was going on. They could not know that they were being merely harassed; the lucky shot had seemed like a successful attack. In the chaos that followed, word shot through the boat that the hull had been breached. In fact it was just a burst pipe… but the command staff had had enough.

The order was given to return fire with the nuclear torpedo. The sub came to periscope depth and scanned the surroundings; the destroyer Beale was steaming away, but a more tempting target, the carrier USS Randolph, was visible in the distance. It presented an easy broadside target. The torpedo, once launched, ran true but detonated early, about a hundred yards short of the Randolph at a depth of about three meters. With a yield of fifteen kilotons, the resulting shockwave caved in the side of the Randolph, sending it to the bottom in under a minute. Two other destroyers, the Beale and USS Cony (DD-508), were also sent to the bottom. More than 3,000 sailors went down on the Randolph; only 203 survived. Six hundred crew went down with the destroyers. Destroyers USS Bache (DD-470) and USS Barry (DD-933) also received heavy damage, but managed to limp back to port.